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Agri-environmental schemes are taking on much greater importance in the overall 
policy mix for agriculture in European Union (EU) countries. Various schemes have been 
tried over the last 15 years, and new ones are being introduced in such countries as the 
United Kingdom (Dobbs and Pretty) and France. The U.S. 2002 farm bill (Farm Security 
and Rural Investment Act of 2002) introduced a major new agri-environmental scheme-
the Conservation Security Program-similar to some of those in Europe. In France, there 
is a fairly long history of food 'quality' schemes. 'Quality' is used in the French context 
to denote taste, healthfulness, and conditions of production. One of the best-known 
French quality schemes is the Label Rouge (LR, or Red Label) scheme, created in 1960. 
'Eco-Iabeling' is a more recent phenomenon on both sides of the Atlantic. Eco-Iabels are 
meant to provide consumers with information about a product's environmental impact. 
Often these labels contain information about the production of the product, as does the 
organic label (agricultural biologique, in France). Both types of labeling schemes are 
gaining in importance for food products in Europe and North America, in part because of 
potential positive impacts on the environment. 
As France, other EU countries, and the U.S. place greater emphasis on schemes 
which reward farmers for environmental stewardship-both through the market and 
through government stewardship payments-it is important to know whether these 
'quality' and 'eco-Iabeling' schemes do, indeed, provide measurable environmental 
benefits. If they do. then policies can be implemented to foster and encourage these 
schemes, in which a substantial portion of the incentive for farmer adoption comes 
through price premiums consumers are willing to pay. If they do not, a policy conclusion 
might be that though the schemes have possible health, taste, or other consumer benefits, 
they should not be relied on for much in the way of environmental benefits. An 
alternative possible policy conclusion is that perhaps the criteria for eligibility and 
certification with these schemes should be broadened or strengthened to bring about 
greater environmental benefits. 
In his theoretical analysis of the relationship between food quality and 
environmental quality, Thiebaut points out three possible levels where the relationship 
can be observed. At the territorial level, there can be joint production of final quality 
food products and environmental services (e.g., wine and landscape). At the farmer's 
level, there can be simultaneous production of quality food products and environmental 
goods (e.g., positive externalities, or reduction of negative externalities). Finally, at the 
consumer's level, there can be joint demand for quality food and protection of the 
environment. Kephaliacos and Robin suggest another way to look at the relationship 
between food quality and environmental quality. They suggest analyses at the input level 
(e.g., not allowing certain joint inputs) and at the output level (e.g., the nature of 
interdependencies between the quantities or characteristics of the outputs). Our study's 
main objective was to analyze the extent of the relationship between food quality and 
output quality at thefarmer's level by looking at the production process and at the nature 
ofoutputs. 
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Van Ravenswaay studied some of the challenges facing environmental labeling. 
She notes that environmental labeling has created two controversies. They involve (1) the 
potential for consumer deception and (2) whether environmental labels should also serve 
environmental policy objectives. Consumers' ability to discern whether or not a product 
has been produced in an environmentally sound manner remains tenuous (Erickson and 
Kramer-LeBlanc). Lohr notes that there are many certifications-in addition to organic­
for environmentally oriented production systems. She indicates that although consumer 
interest in purchasing food products with 'green' production characteristics is growing, 
given that existing eco-Iabels are not well-defmed in consumers' minds, there is 
substantial potential for new labels with vague criteria that are not legally defined to 
generate confusion. Thiebaut articulates the additional problem ofdetermining whether 
specially labeled products contribute to both "internal" quality (e.g., taste) and "external" 
quality (production of positive environmental externalities, or reduction of negative 
ones). 
In this paper, results are reported for analys es we recently conducted to examine 
the environmental effects of major 'quality' and 'eco-labeling' schemes in use in the 
Midi-Pyrenees region of the south of France. Schemes analyzed are described in the next 
section. Following that, the data and methods of analysis are explained. Next, results of 
statistical analyses are presented. These results are complemented by qualitative results 
drawn from in-depth case studies of three food quality schemes. Conclusions and policy 
implications are presented in the last section of the paper. 
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Quality and eco-Iabeling schemes examinedi 
One 'eco-label' and three 'quality' categories were examined in this study. The 
eco-label included in the study was Agriculture Biologique (AB), organic agriculture. 
France officially recognized organic agriculture in 1980, and allowed fanners to use the 
label "product made from organic agriculture" and created public standards to regulate 
the industry (Ministere de l' Agriculture et de la peche). Although we refer here to the 
French AB as an 'eco-label', in reality, it has always been considered a regular food 
'quality' label like others described below. Most French consumers think that the AB 
label guarantees not only the non-use of chemical inputs, but also the taste and health 
nature of the resulting food product. 
One of the quality label categories included in the study was the Official Sign of 
Quality (SOQ). SOQ products receive an official government label that requires 
producers to follow specific guidelines for production of the product. Included in this 
category are the Appellation d'Origine eontrOlee (AOe, controlled origin label) and the 
Label Rouge. ii The French controlled origin label was established in 1919 for the wine 
sector. It then spread to milk products and, in 1990, to all other agricultural food 
products. The AOe label implies more than horizontal differentiation; it also testifies that 
the product has been produced from local raw products in a place-specific mode, and that 
its high quality characteristics are the result of substantial long-term collective and 
individual investments (Kilkenny and Daniel). The Label Rouge was created for products 
that possess specific characteristics and enjoy a superior level of quality that distinguish 
them from other similar prod\£ts (Ministere de l'Agriculture et de 1a Peche). It 
guarantees a better taste and high standards of production, while the AOe guarantees 
primarily the origin of the product. The Label Rouge is a nationwide structure that ties 
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highly localized groups of producers and their supplier and processing networks together 
to deliver consumer products that differ from industrial products. The differences 
supposedly are distinguishable with regard to intrinsic quality, food safety, 
environmentally sound production practices, and product image (Westgren). 
Another quality label category included in the study is referred to here as Other 
Cahier des Charges (CDC). These products are not under an official government label, 
but they are produced in a quality way under specific guidelines from a cooperative, 
supermarket, or agricultural supplier. The cahier des charges is the formal document that 
specifies the agreed production guidelines. 
Also included in the study were Official Sign of Quality of Transformed Food 
(SOQT) products. While SOQ products concern raw materials, the SOQT category 
pertains to the outputs of food industries, including cooperatives. It includes the LR and 
the AOC. The guidelines do not directly concern farmers; instead, they apply to 
processing or manufacturing of food. An example of this designation is AOC Roquefort. 
The quality label specifies the cheese's production process, rather than the process of 
producing the milk. 
Finally, we included an In Process (IP) category. Producers in this category were 
just starting to switch over to an eco-Iabel (AB) or quality (SOQ, CDC, or SOQT) 
approach. 
Data and methods of analysis 
Data analyzed in this study were collected by researchers from three different 
agencies-SOLAGRO (a private agricultural and environmental association), the 
Regional Chamber of Agriculture of the Midi-Pyrenees, and the Department of 
Agriculture of the Haute-Garonne. The data were made available to a research team at the 
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Ecole Nationale Superiere Agronomique de Toulouse (ENSAT), in France. The original 
data set contained infonnation on fanners' practices and on factors that could be scored 
from an environmental standpoint. Fanners were called and asked if they were involved 
in any agn.environmental schemes, eco-Iabeling programs, and quality labeling 
programs. The usable data set covered 107 fann operations in the Midi-Pyrenees region 
of the south of France. The categorization of these fanns is shown in Table 1. Fifty of 
those fanns were participating in one of the eco- or quality label programs (including 
three that were In Process). 
Table 2 constitutes a glossary of environmental scores used in the analyses. This 
is not an exhaustive list of the environmental scores that were recorded for fanns in the 
data set, but the list does include the scores most often used in our analyses. 
Environmental scores consisted of eight components. One set of aggregate scores (PS 1 
and PS2) was based on two broad components: (l) overall diversity of production; and 
(2) appropriate use of inputs such as synthetic chemical fertilizer. A second set (PEl 
through PE6) was based on a more detailed breakdown, consisting of six components: (1) 
water use; (2) soil fertility and erosion; (3) plant and animal diversity; (4) air quality (e.g., 
emissions of greenhouse gases); (5) resource consumption (e.g., net production of 
renewable energy); and (6) waste management. Analyses were carried out using various 
individual components and combinations of components. 
Fann size variables referred to in the results section below are defined as follows: 
SAU-Score equal to one full- time employee on a fann; 
UTH-Nurnber of hectares on the fann; and 
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MBS-An index of the economic size of a farm (a measure of the 
difference between the regional standard value of all production on 
a farm and the regional standard production costs). 
We carried out analyses with this data set to detennine the correlation between a 
fanner'S participation in any of the eco-Iabeling and quality labeling schemes and the 
environmental score of his or her farming system. In other words, we wished to examine 
whether the production of quality food was associated with the production of any 
environmental goods. Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), we 
carried out factor analyses, regression analyses, and analyses of variance. Due to space 
limitations in this paper, we focus primarily on the analyses of variance. We report 
briefly on one of the factor analyses, but ignore the regression analyses here. 
Results of statistical analysesiii 
Factor analyses were conducted to identifY a small number of factors that may be 
used to represent relationships among sets of interrelated variables. The goal was to 
identifY groups of farmers that share similar characteristics-such as high environmental 
grades, size of farm, income, eco-Iabel or quality approach followed, or number of 
workers-to determine if a particular eco-label or quality approach can be characterized 
in a certain way. One of the factor analyses is explained next. Then, we turn to the 
analyses of variance. 
Factor analysis 
For purposes of the factor analyses, eco-Iabeling and quality approaches were 
ordered from presumed least environmental impact to presumed highest environmental 
impact, based on the level of environmental quality that each approach was thought to 
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demand. Fanners not participating in any eco-Iabeling or quality approach were assigned 
a rank of I (one), IP farmers were given a 2 (two), those following an SOQT approach 
were given a 3 (three), those following a CDC approach were given a 4 (four), those 
following an SOQ approach were given a 5 (five), and AB fanners were given a 6 (six). 
One of the factor analyses was designed to determine if either large or small farms 
tend to be associated with high total environmental scores or if either large or small fanns 
are especially likely to be involved in quality or eco-Iabeling schemes. Two distinct 
clusters were identified in this analysis (Figure I). One cluster was composed of fanners 
with relatively small fanns, low environmental scores (PSI + PS2) and a low level of 
participation in quality and eco-Iabeling schemes (i.e., not participating at all, IP, or 
participating in a scheme thought, a priori, to provide less environmental benefit than 
some others). The other cluster also was composed of relatively small farms, but these 
fanns had high total environmental scores and participated in schemes thought, a priori, 
to provide greater environmental benefits (e.g., AB). Larger farms were split in a similar 
fashion, with about half engaged in higher-level quality or eco-Iabeling schemes and 
having high environmental scores, and the other half having low total environmental 
scores and participating in no or lower-level quality and eco-Iabeling schemes. On 
average, farms participating in a quality scheme have significantly higher environmental 
scores than the non-participating fanns. 
Analyses of variance 
Numerous Analysis of Variance (ANOV A) tests were run to examine impacts of 
particular quality and eco-Iabeling schemes on various environmental indicators. In one 
test, quality and eco-Iabeling schemes were compared on the basis of mean aggregate 
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environmental scores using the first set (of two) components (PSt and PS2). Fanners 
participating in SOQT schemes had the highest mean score, and fanners involved in AB 
and SOQ programs were next highest, but substantially below the mean for SOQT 
fanners (Figure 2). The majority of fanners using SOQT labels raise sheep on extensive 
fanning systems, producing milk for cheese industries. The types of farming systems they 
use have effects on environmental scores independent of fanners' particular 
environmental practices. Fanners not involved in any eco-Iabel or quality programs, as 
expected, did have the lowest average aggregate environmental scores, but that score was 
only slightly lower than the average for fanners in CDC schemes. The mean 
environmental score for SOQT fanners was significantly higher (at the 5% level) than the 
mean scores for fanners in all other categories-including fanners not participating in 
any quality or eco-Iabeling programs (symbolized by N)-except for fanners in the AB 
and IP categories 
A similar ANOVA test is shown in Figure 3, but here the quality and eco-Iabeling 
categories are compared with respect to mean environmental scores based on the sums of 
individual components PE I through PE6. N fanners again had the lowest mean score, but 
in this case AB fanners had the highest score. This is what was originally expected. 
SOQT fanners, as in the first test, perfonned relatively well environmentally, and IP and 
SOQ fanners were not far behind. Once again, CDC fanners did not perfonn as well as 
fanners in other quality and eco-Iabeling programs. Multiple comparisons of the mean 
scores show that AB fanners perfonned significantlyiv better than fanners in all other 
categories except for those in the SOQT and IP categories. 
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Among the additional ANOV A analyses conducted were some in which quality 
and eco-Iabel categories containing a limited number of observations were combined. 
The N, AB, and SOQ categories remained separate, but the SOQT, CDC, and IP 
categories were combined into a new category labeled 0, for Others. One ANOVA was 
conducted with this grouping to examine the relationship between quality/eco-Iabel 
categories and farm size, as measured by the MBS variable. Results in Figure 4 indicate 
that the AB farms are smallest in terms of this economic 'value added' measure, and 
SOQ farms are the largest. Farmers not involved in any quality or eco-Iabeling program 
are the second largest, on average, by this measure. The mean differences between SOQ 
farms and farms in all other categories are significant, but the differences between farms 
in the other categories are not significant. The relatively high value for economic output 
on SOQ farms was not unexpected, because products with SOQ labels, including those 
with the Label Rouge, often generate substantial price premiums. Westgren indicated that 
Label Rouge products can command prices up to 300% over conventional prices. It was 
somewhat surprising that AB farmers had the lowest mean MBS value. However, the 
MBS index is more an indicator of farm size than of the real level of farm income. 
Organic farmers in the study had fewer hectares under production, on average, than did 
SOQ farmers. 
Another ANOV A, with the same quality category grouping, was conducted to 
isolate effects on soil fertility and erosion, as measured by PE2. AB, SOQ, and 0 farms 
had significantly better PE2 performance, on average, than did farms not participating in 
any of these programs (Figure 5). 
lO 
Farms participating in quality and eco-Iabeling programs also performed 
significantly better, on average, on the environmental indicator for plant and animal 
diversity (PE3) than did non-participating farms (Figure 6). AB farms performed best, but 
not significantly better than SOQ and 0 farms. 
Results of qualitative analyses 
In order to complement the above quantitative results and to get more insight on 
the nature of the relationship between quality practices and environmental practices, in­
depth interviews were conducted with a limited number of farmers participating in three 
SOQ programs: CCP ''Covapi'' for fruits, LR ''Poulet Roux du Gers" for poultry, and LR 
"Veau de I'Aveyron et du Segala" for cattle. The farmers' SOQ organizations and 
guidelines were also studied (Table 3). 
The analysis showed that the relationship between food quality and the 
environment appears mainly through inclusion in the SOQ guidelines of environmental 
practices that have an impact on the quality and the image of the product-reduction in 
the use of chemical inputs, preservation of natural habitats in fields, preservation of the 
land's natural characteristics, and respect for animal well being. Farmers participate in 
quality schemes, first, for economic reasons. The schemes allow farmers to occupy 
specific market niches and they do, indeed, help assure a minimum income. Farmers' 
sensitivity to environmental concerns may grow, however, as a result of having to follow 
the environmental guidelines errbedded in the schemes. 
The extent of changes in farming system and practices induced by SOQ 
guidelines varies with the SOQ. The respect for animal well being required of poultry 
producers under the LR 'Foulet Roux du Gers" label mainly involves certain building 
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specifications and small changes in breeding practices. In contrast, changes in fruit 
production practices could be significant in the case of the CCP ''Covapi'' label, because 
farmers have to adopt new chemical and other production practices. In this case, farmers 
tend to become more sensitive to environmental issues and naturally develop new 
environmental practices independently of the SOQ guidelines. Technicians for the SOQ 
organizations play an important role in developing farmer sensitivity to environmental 
issues. 
The analysis revealed two other major determinants of the adoption of 
environmental practices by farmers: the impact of these practices on the farm's 
productivity and the opportunities for their monetary reward. We observed that certain 
environmental practices have been adopted because they help reduce yield risks or lower 
operating costs. Farmer behavior towards the environment is also very dependent of 
consumer attitudes. It is easier for farmers participating in the CCP 'Covapi" to stop 
using chemicals because they can be compensated by a price premium consumers 
sensitive to healthy products are willing to pay. Similarly, to improve their image to 
consumers and make their territory more attractive for tourism, farmers participating to 
the LR "Veau d'Aveyron and du Segala" have decided, in addition to satisfying the SOQ 
guidelines, to preserve the natural environment surrounding their farms. Farmers selling 
products directly to consumers-like "Covapi" fruit producers or producers of 'Veau 
d'Aveyron and du Segala" meat-will, indeed, be more sensitive to environmental 
concerns, due to their close contact with consumers. The difficulty in commanding price 
premiums for environmental practices less visible to consumers in SOQ schemes makes 
those practices less attractive to farmers. 
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Conclusions and policy implications 
This research showed that organic fanns and fanns enrolled in various quality 
labeling programs in France do provide some environmental benefits to society. 
However, they do not necessarily perform better than other farms on all environmental 
measures. This is not surprising for French food quality labels, as most of those labels 
were not originally designed for environmental purposes. Most originally were intended 
to enhance marketability through appeals to such consumer values as taste and health. 
Although an SOQ approach involves farmers in organizational and contractual 
relationships, quality food products are private goods by nature. In contrast to many 
environmental goods, tl:eir production does not necessarily require any collective action 
or any specific coordination scheme among farmers in a territory. It is difficult to 
incorporate such collective action or coordination in standard SOQ guidelines. However, 
there do appear to be opportunities to strengthen certification criteria to enhance 
environmental quality provided by the various French labeling schemes. 
There have been a few efforts by farmer organizations in France to develop 
specific "eco-Iabels". These are commercial labels, not SOQ labels. They are, for the 
moment, too new to provide specific lessons. However, eco-Iabels may not constitute an 
efficient signal to consumers about farmers' environmental stewardship, due to an 
asymmetric information problem associated with the great increase in the number of all 
sorts of official and no&official quality labels; it is difficult for consumers to access and 
understand all the guidelines and to sort out the highly heterogeneous guidelines 
regarding prescribed environmental measures and their likely efficacies. As the EU 
continues with reforms in its Common Agricultural Policy, a critical issue is what mix of 
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government direct payments and market mechanisms to use in fostering expanded use of 
environmental practices. The resolution of that issue depends greatly on the extent to 
which quality and eco-labels can send clear and reasonably reliable market signals to 
consumers who are willing to pay for environmental goods provided jointly with food 
products. 
One lesson from the French experience with quality labels for U.S. eco-Iabeling 
schemes is that schemes need to be very clear about what the expectations are and what 
guidelines must be followed in order for producers to qualify for a particular label. This 
will help prevent producers and consumers from suffering the consequences of 
misinformation, such as distrust in the agricultural sector to provide accurate information 
about a product's environmental impacts. Labeling a food product as "natural", 
"produced with reduced use of chemicals", or "South Dakota grown", for example, does 
not assure that the production methods used are, on balance, beneficial to the 
environment. Implied claims need to be backed up by transparent and verifiable 
standards. Other than the organic labe~ few eco-Iabels in the U.S. yet do this. 
Another lesson is that as U.S. value-added agriculture and rural development 
efforts begin to place more emphasis on foods with regional identities, environmental 
criteria should be built in at the outset. There B a long history of foods with regional 
identities in France, but environmental objectives and criteria were not originally 
incorporated in many of the regional and other 'quality' food labels there. With growing 
environmental concerns in France and elsewhere in Europe, there is policy interest in 
trying to simultaneously achieve both (a) regional economic and (b) environmental 
objectives with 'quality' and 'eco-Iabels'. If this approach is to be used, it is best to build 
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both objectives into labeling schemes at the outset, as the Midwest Food Alliance has 
attempted to do (Midwest Food Alliance). 
Finally, U.S. policy makers may wish to broaden selected government agri­
environmental schemes to explicitly incorporate rural development objectives, as do 
schemes like France's Contrat Territoriale d'Exploitation (CTE, or Territorial Contract of 
Farming). We are thinking, in particular, of the new Conservation Security Program 
(CSP). Although rules are yet to be fmalized for the CSpv, it is widely assumed that 
many, if not most, organically certified farms will, without great difficulty, be able to 
qualify for payments under one of the CSP's higher two tiers. If some other eco-Iabeling 
schemes become rigorous enough, perhaps farmers participating in some of those 
schemes also will be able to demonstrate sufficient positive environmental actions or 
results to qualify. Were the CSP to also include rural development objectives, as does 
France's CTE, than farmers participating in food labeling schemes that combine both 
rural development and environmental objectives might receive special support. Then, 
farmers could receive incentives to alter their production systems through both market-
driven price premiums and government payments. 
Endnotes 
i See Bertramsen, Nguyen, and Dobbs for a brief comparison of 'quality' and 'eco-Iabeling' schemes in 

France and the United States. 

ii The AB belongs to the SOQ category. 

iii For more complete and detailed results of the empirical analyses, see Bertamsen. 

iv All references to significant differences, henceforth, refer to the 5% level. 

v As of mid-May 2003. 
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Table 2. Breakdown of environmental scores 
PSI: This score, worth 70 total points, defines the mix of the fann and the diversity of 
production. It includes plant diversity (30 points), animal diversity (22 points), and natural 
elements and space (18 points). 
PS2: This score, worth 30 points, defines the rational use of inputs on the fann. It includes the 
use of nitrogen (7.5 points), phosphorous (3.0 points), water (6.0 points), phytosanitaries (7.5 
points), and energy (6.0 points). 
PEl: This score, worth 100 points, describes the quality and quantity of water used on the 
fann. It includes nitrogen discharges (14 points), phosphorous discharges (14 points), 
management of water (14 points), phytosanitary residue (15 points), effluent discharges (14 
points), protection by organization offann space (15 points), and protection by natural elements 
(14 points). 
PE2: This score, worth 100 points, describes soil fertility and erosion. It includes management 
of organic material (35 points), risk: of erasion (45 points), and quality of soil and pollutants in the 
soil (20 points). 
PE3: This score, worth 100 points, describes plant and animal diversity on the fann or ranch. It 
includes natural elements (25 points), pennanent prairies that are not fertilized very much (20 
points), spaces with weak potential, such as dry or wet areas (10 points), zones of biological 
interest (15 points), absence or limited use of pesticides (20 points), threatened animal breeds (5 
points), and old varieties of plants (5 ponts). 
PE4: This score, worth 100 points, describes the quality ofair on the fann or ranch. It includes 
emissions of greenhouse gases (35 points), emissions of ozone-depleting and acetic gases (15 
points), emissions ofphytosanitaries (25 points), smell nuisances (10 points), and production of 
oxygen (15 points). 
ru: This score, worth 100 points, describes the consumption of resources on the fann or 
ranch. It includes direct energy consumption (20 points), indirect energy consumption (15 points), 
phosphates bought (15 points), potassium bought (15 points), water consumed (15 points), and 
net production of renewable energy (20points). 
PE6: This score, worth 100 points, describes the storing and handling of waste on the fann or 
ranch. It includes the handling and storing of dangerous wastes (50 points), the handling and 
storing of potentially dangerous wastes (20 points), and the handling and storing ofplastic and 
metal wastes (30 points). 
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Table 3. Selected qualitative results of the study of three SOQ schemes 
LR "Poulet Roux du 
Gers" 
f. _IL .:', 
LR "Veau du Segal a 
et de I'Aveyron" 
(cattle) 
CCP "Covapi" 
(fruits) 
Type of participation 
in the quality scheme 
Through the 
cooperative 
Through the 
cooperative 
Individual 
Motivations of 
farmers to 
participate in the 
scheme 
Economic (value­
added + better 
conditions of work) 
Economic (value­
added, reduction of 
market risks and price 
variations) 
Economic (value­
added) 
Environmental 
practices specified in 
guidelines 
Animal well-being: 
building norms, 
munber of animals per 
unit of surface, 
planting ofplants to 
provide shade 
Animal well-being : 
building norms, 
number of animals per 
unit of surface 
Reduction of 
chemicals 
Preservation of 
biodiversity 
Preservation of the 
soil's characteristics 
Any additional 
environmental 
practices adopted 
independently of the 
guidelines 
Improvement of the 
farm's surrounding: 
management ofwaste, 
preservation of the 
naturalenviron[Oent 
Reduction ofthe 
traditional practice of 
cutting trees to 
accelerate fruit 
maturation 
Sensitivity of farmer 
to environmental 
issues 
No Yes, important to 
improve the image of 
agriculture and attract 
tourists 
Yes, important to 
improve the image of 
the product for 
consumers and to 
improve the quality of 
life 
Additional factors 
contributing to the 
adoption of 
environmental 
practices 
Dynamism of the 
farmerSOQ 
organization 
(collective action) 
Role of the SOQ 
organization's 
technicians 
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Figure I. Factor analysis of quality codes, SAU, UTH, MBS, and PSI+PS2 
Communalities 
Initial Extraction 
Quality code 1.000 .111 
SAU 1.000 .619 
UTH 1.000 .141 
MBS 1.000 .182 
PS1+PS2 1.000 .626 
Extraction Method: Pnnclpal Component Analy. 

Total Variance Explained 

Initial Eiaenvalues Extraction Sums of Sauared loadinas 
Component % of Cumulative %Total V"rl"",, .. 
% of Cumulative %Total V"rh.n".. 
1 1.998 39.96 39.96 1.998 39.96 39.96 
2 1.481 29.13 69.69 1.481 29.13 69.69 
3 .143 14.86 84.56 
4 .415 9.496 94.06 
5 .291 5.939 100.00 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Component Matrll4!l 
Com~onent 
1 2 
Quality code 5.67E-02 .841 
SAU .740 -.268 
UTH .789 .352 
MBS .884 3.60E'()2 
PS1+PS2 -2OQ .763 
ExIracIion Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
3~---------------r----------------------------------------' 
81 
96. 
21 
3"2 
co 
102 92 
" 
N 99 
29~ 
+
..... 
~ 0 +-------~~~~~~~~&_------------------------------------__t 
-g 82 50 
co CI 6. 
II) CI 104 
"0 CI " 8 -1 59 55 
~ " 51§ 
o ~ +---------------+-------~------~------~~----~----~ ~ 4 0 234 5 
Size offarm 
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Figure 2. ANOVA for quality codes and PS1+PS2 
F-test 
De.crlptive. 
PS1+PS2 
95% Confidence Inlerval for 
Mean 
Sid, Std, 
N Mean Deviation Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum 
1 N 
21P 
57 
3 
41,121 
50.167 
15.899 
27,872 
2.106 
16.092 
36.902 
·19.071 
45.339 
119.405 
16.23 
29.30 
88.57 
81.82 
3 SOOT 
4 CDC 
5 
9 
72.450 
41,606 
7.045 
13,050 
3.151 
4,350 
63,703 
31,574 
81.197 
51,637 
60,81 
25.13 
77.99 
63.24 
5S0Q 25 55,860 16.391 3,278 49.094 62.625 25.87 79.47 
6AB 
Total 
8 
1n7 
57.898 
1.7 !i77 
13.594 
1771.A 
4.806 
1 711\ 
46.532 
U17!i 
89.263 
~n!l7!1 
44,08 
111 ?:>. 
79.18 
RR fi1 
PS1+PS2 
sum Of 
S!tuares df Mean Sqyare F Sill. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
8377.1316 
25011.52 
33389.13 
5 
101 
106 
1675.523 
247.639 
6.766 .000 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: PS1+PS2 
LSD 
(I) Ouality code (.!l Ouali~code 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-Jt Std. Error SJD. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 N 21P -9.0461 9.3215 .334 -27.5375 9.4453 
3S0QT -31.3295' 7.3398 .000 -45.8896 -16.7693 
4 CDC -.4850 5.6445 .932 -11.6821 10.7121 
5S0Q 
-14.7391' 3.7749 .000 -22.2275 -7.2506 
6AB -16.7770' 5.9413 .006 -28.5630 -4.9910 
21P 1 N 9.0461 9.3215 .334 -9.4453 27.5375 
3S0QT 
-22.2833 11.4923 .055 -45.0811 .5144 
4CDC 8.5611 10.4910 .416 -12.2503 29.3725 
5S0Q -5.6929 9.6152 .555 -24.7669 13.3810 
6AB 
-7.7308 10.6537 .470 -28.8649 13.4032 
3 SOOT 1 N 31.3295' 7.3398 .000 16.7693 45.8896 
21P 22.2833 11.4923 .055 -.5144 45.0811 
4 CDC 30.8444' 8.7774 .001 13.4324 48.2565 
5S00 16.5904' 7.7093 .034 1.2972 31.8836 
6AB 14.5525 8.9712 .108 -3.2440 32.3490 
4COC 1 N .4850 5.6445 .932 -10.7121 11.6821 
21P -8.5611 10.4910 .416 -29.3725 12.2503 
3 SOOT -30.8444' 8.7774 .001 -48.2565 -13.4324 
5S00 -14.2540' 6.1173 .022 -26.3891 -2.1190 
6AB -16.2919* 7.6466 .036 -31.4607 -1.1232 
5S00 1 N 14.7391' 3.7749 .000 7.2506 22.2275 
21P 5.6929 9.6152 .555 .13.3810 24.7669 
3 SOOT ·16.5904* 7.7093 .034 -31.8836 -1.2972 
4 CDC 14.2540* 6.1173 .022 2.1190 26.3891 
6AB ·2.0379 6.3922 .751 ·14.7183 10.6425 
6AB IN 16.7710' 5.9413 .006 4.9910 28.5630 
21P 7.7308 10.6537 .470 ·13.4032 28.8649 
3 SOOT ·14.5525 8.9712 .108 -32.3490 3.2440 
4CDC 16.2919' 7,6466 .036 1.1232 31.4607 
5S0Q 2,0379 6.3922 .751 ·10.6425 14.7183 
, ,
" The mean difference IS Significant at the .05 level. 
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Figure 3. ANOVA for quality codes and PEl+PE2+PE3+PE4+PE5+PE6 
F-test 
Descrlptlvell 
PE1+PE2+PE3+PE4+PE5+PE6 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Std. Mean 
N Mean Deviation Sid. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum 
1 N 57 280.692 69.140 9.156 262.346 299.037 187.08 519.09 
21P 3 321.093 94.795 54.730 85.611 556.576 225.53 415.10 
3 SOOT 5 352.668 98.741 44.158 230.085 475.291 202.32 443.52 
4 CDC 9 292.527 42.582 14.194 259.795 325.258 201.95 351.76 
5S0Q 25 320.293 73.807 14.761 289.827 350.759 186.44 446.65 
6AB 8 386.676 49.361 17.452 345.410 427.943 328.79 482.02 
Total 107 303.361 74.803 7.231 289.024 317.898 186.44 519.09 
PE1+PE2+PE3+PE4+PE5+PE6 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
106156.6 
486967.3 
593123.9 
5 
101 
108 
21231.312 
4821.459 
I 4.404 .001 
Multiple Comparillonll 
DependentVariab~:PE1+PE2+PE3+PE4+PE5+PE6 
LSD 
(I) Quality code (J) Quality code 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 N 21P -40.4016 41.1308 .328 -121.9941 41.1906 
300QT 
-71.9964' 32.3864 .028 -136.2423 -7.7505 
4CDC -11.8351 24.9059 .636 -61.2417 37.5715 
5S0Q 
-39.6012' 16.6567 .019 -72.6436 -6.5566 
6AB -105.9847' 26.2158 .000 -157.9898 -53.9795 
2 IP 1 N 40.4018 41.1308 .328 -41.1906 121.9941 
3 SOOT -31.5947 50.7094 .535 -132.1885 68.9992 
4 CDC 2B.5667 46.2911 .539 -63.2625 120.3959 
5S00 .8005 42.4265 .985 -83.3823 84.9634 
6AB ·65.5829 47.0089 .166 -156.8359 27.6701 
3 SOOT 1 N 71.9964' 32.3864 .028 7.7505 136.2423 
21P 31.5947 50.7094 .535 -68.9992 132.1885 
4 CDC 60.1613 38.7300 .123 -16.6885 136.9911 
5S00 32.3952 34.0169 .343 -35.0852 99.8756 
6AB 39.5850 .393 
-
44.5378 
4CDC 1 N 11.8351 24.9059 .636 -37.5715 61.2417 
21P 
-28.5667 46.2911 .539 -120.3959 63.2625 
3500T 
-60.1613 38.7300 .123 -136.9911 16.6885 
5500 
6AB 
·27.7661 
-94.1496' 
28.9921 
33.7402 
.308 
.006 
-81.3113 
·161.0810 
25.7790 
"'7 ... a< 
5500 1 N 39.6012' 16.6567 .019 6.5568 72.6436 
2 IP -.8005 42.4285 .985 -64.9634 83.3623 
350QT 
-32.3952 34.0169 .343 -99.8756 35.0852 
4 CDC 27.7661 26.9921 .306 -25.7790 81.3113 
6AB 
-68.3634' 28.2053 .021 -122.3352 -10.4317 
6AB 1 N 105.9847' 28.2156 .000 53.9795 157.9898 
21P 65.5829 47.0089 .166 -27.6701 158.8359 
300QT 33.9882 39.5850 .393 -44.5378 112.5143 
4CDC 94.1496' 33.7402 .006 27.2181 161.0810 
5S00 66.3834' 28.2053 .021 10.4317 122.3352 
'. The mean difference IS Significant at the .05 level. 
22 

Figure 4. ANOV A for combined quality codes and MBS 
F-test 
Oescriptives 
MBS 
Std. 
N Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound r Bound Minimum Maximum 
1 N 71141.04 9422.86 55966.71 93719.23 11368 423998 
20 70516.36 15895 115550 
3S0Q 
4AB 
Total 
MBS 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F S~. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
1.2E+11 
8.9E+11 
10F+1? 
3 
103 
106 
4.087E+10 
8641452539 
4.729 .004 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: MBS 
L5D 
(J) Combin 
Mean 
Difference ~50/0 Confidence Interva 
I(I) Combined Quality Quality cod (I-J) Std. ErrOl 5ig. ower Boun. Upper Boun 
1 N 20 
3500 
4AB 
18617.32 
66644.17* 
43387.42 
15689.01 
~299.38 
~096.81 
.470 
.004 
.219 
·32330.77 
110869.74 
-26218.83 
69565.41 
·22418.60 
112993.66 
20 1 N 
3500 
4AB 
18617.32 
85261.49* 
24770.09 
~689.01 
~222.92 
~856.02 
.470 
.004 
.536 
-69565.41 
143218.25 
-54274.92 
32330.77 
-27304.73 
103815.11 
3500 1 N 
20 
4AB 
66644.17* 
85261.49* 
10031.58* 
~299.38 
~222.92 
7760.29 
.004 
.004 
.004 
22418.60 
27304.73 
35142.95 
110869.74 
143218.25 
184920.22 
4AB 1 N 
20 
3500 
~3387.42 
24770.09 
10031.58* 
~096.81 
~856.02 
rr760.29 
.219 
.536 
.004 
112993.66 
103815.11 
184920.22 
26218.83 
54274.92 
-35142.95 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Figure 5. ANOV A for combined quality codes and PE2 
F-test 
Descriptives 
95% Confidence Interval for 
N Meal 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
Meal 
MiiTun MaxirunLower Bound Ll~Bound 
1N 57 53.538 16.143 2.138 49.255 57.821 32.39 100.00 
20 17 66.974 19.691 4.824 56.747 n.200 40.21 98.64 
3800 25 69.899 20.212 4.042 61.556 78.242 32.66 99.04 
4AB 8 69.231 20.940 7.404 51.725 86.738 45.38 100.00 
Total 107 60.669 19.447 1.880 56.941 64.396 32.39 100.00 
PE2 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Si~. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
6290.714 
33798.04 
40088.76 
3 
103 
106 
2096.905 
328.136 
6.390 .001 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: PE2 
LSD 
(J) Combined 
Mean 
Difference 95% Confidence Interval 
(I) Combined quality code quality code (I.J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound U~Bound 
1N 20 -13.4356" 5.0059 .008 -23.3636 -3.5076 
3800 -16.3613" 4.3454 .000 -24.9793 -7.7433 
4AB -15.6934" 6.8391 .024 -29.2572 -2.1295 
20 1N 13.4356* 5.0059 .008 3.5076 23.3836 
3800 -2.9257 5.6945 .609 -14.2194 8.3681 
4AB -2.2577 7.7665 .772 -17.6608 13.1454 
3800 1N 16.3613" 4.3454 .000 7.7433 24.9793 
20 2.9257 5.6945 .609 -8.3681 14.2194 
4AB .6680 7.3582 .928 -13.9252 15.2611 
4AB 1N 15.6934" 6.8391 .024 2.1295 29.2572 
20 2.2577 7.7665 .772 -13.1454 17.6608 
3800 -.6680 7.3582 .92tt -t5.2611 13.9252 
". The mean difference is significant at the .05Ieve!. 
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Figure 6. ANOV A for combined quality codes and PE3 
F-test 
Oescrlptlves 
95% Confidence Interval for 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
Mean 
MriTun MaximumLower Bound U~Bound 
1 N 57 19.034 17.264 2.287 14.453 23.615 1.35 89.00 
20 17 30.178 21.298 5.166 19.228 41.129 1.02 70.95 
3SOQ 25 30.887 21.510 4.302 22.008 39.766 1.47 67.53 
4AB 8 41.899 12.501 4.420 31.448 52.350 27.67 70.00 
Total 107 25.284 19.852 1.919 21.479 29Ala9 1.02 89.00 
PE3 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
5626.918 
36147.05 
41773.97 
3 
103 
106 
1875.639 
350.942 
5.345 .002 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: PE3 
LSD 
(J) Combine 
I(I) Combined quality c( quality code 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
~ower Bound ~erBou~ 
1 N 20 
3S00 
4AB 
-11.1440* 
-11.8530* 
-22.8645* 
5.1769 
4.4938 
7.0728 
.034 
.010 
.002 
-21.4112 
-20.7655 
-36.8918 
-.8768 
-2.9405 
-8.8373 
20 1 N 
3S00 
4AB 
11.1440* 
-.7090 
-11.7205 
5.1769 
5.8891 
8.0319 
.034 
.904 
.148 
.8768 
-12.3886 
-27.6499 
21.4112 
10.9707 
4.2089 
3S00 1 N 
20 
4AB 
11.8530* 
.7090 
-11.0116 
4.4938 
5.8891 
7.6096 
.010 
.904 
.151 
2.9405 
-10.9707 
-26.1033 
20.7655 
12.3886 
4.0802 
4AB 1 N 
20 
3S00 
22.8645* 
11.7205 
11.0116 
7.0728 
8.0319 
7.6096 
.002 
.148 
.151 
8.8373 
-4.2089 
-4.0802 
36.8918 
27.6499 
26.1033 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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